624LM - STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA MEDIOEVALE 2018
Schema della sezione
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In David Manley, David J. Chalmers & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. 2009 pp. 347-383
On the now dominant Quinean view, metaphysics is about what there is. Metaphysics so conceived is concerned with such questions as whether properties exist, whether meanings exist, and whether numbers exist. I will argue for the revival of a more traditional Aristotelian view, on which metaphysics is about what grounds what. Metaphysics so revived does not bother asking whether properties, meanings, and numbers exist (of course they do!) The question is whether or not they are fundamental.
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Bibliografia sul grounding curata e aggiornata da K. Trogdon su PhilPapers.org
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traduzione italiana di W.V.O. Quine, On What There Is, «Review of Metaphysics», 2 (1948), pp. 21-38 da: Metafisica. Classici contemporanei, a cura di Achille Varzi, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2009, pp. 24-42
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voce "Metaphysical Grounding" di R. Bliss and K. Trogdon su Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2014
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In Miguel Hoeltje, Benjamin Schnieder & Alex Steinberg (eds.), Varieties of Dependence: Ontological Dependence, Grounding, Supervenience, Response-Dependence (Basic Philosophical Concepts). Philosophia Verlag. 2013 pp. 97-122.
The primary goal of this chapter is to set out and clarify some of the central issues and disputes concerning grounding (alternatively, the in virtue of relation, priority, metaphysical explanation, and so on).
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in «Philosophy Compass», 10/5 (2015), pp. 322-333
This essay focuses on a recently prominent notion of ground which is distinctive for how it links metaphysics to explanation. Ground is supposed to serve both as the common factor in diverse in virtue of questions as well as the structuring relation in the project of explaining how some phenomena are “built” from more fundamental phenomena. My aim is to provide an opinionated synopsis of this notion of ground without engaging with others
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Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60/6 (2017) pp. 625-655
There has been much recent interest in a distinctively metaphysical kind of determinative explanation: ground. This paper concerns various skeptical challenges to ground’s relevance to metaphysics, such as that it is an empty posit, that the work it is supposed to do is appropriated by other notions, and that it is inapt for specific issues it should serve. I argue against these challenges. My strategy is both critical and constructive. Critical because I argue that versions of these challenges raised by Elizabeth Barnes, Kathrin Koslicki, Mari Mikkola, and Jessica Wilson are not persuasive. Constructive because we may nevertheless learn from them new work for ground.
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Il sito della Commissio scotistica internationalis, che cura l'edizione critica delle opere di Duns Scoto
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La voce su Scoto della Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, a cura di Thomas Williams
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Raccolta di link a edizioni antiche delle opere di Scoto mantenuta da Sydney Penner
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Pagina su Scoto all'interno del portale "Franciscan Archive": contiene risorse sulla biografia e le opere di Scoto e alcuni studi di rilevante interesse)
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in Recherches de thèologie et philosophie médiévales, 67.1 (2000), pp. 96-113
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